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ABSTRACT
Darwin's Origin launched evolution into theoretical orbit and it continues to influence its course. 
This magnum opus detailed a tenable solution to the most fundamental problem of human existence, 
and although this  Promethean vision contains  a  few minor errors, there is  one nontrivial  error 
which misguides several crucial developments – not only in the evolving structure of evolutionary 
theory, but across the entire spectrum of science, including politico-economics.  This problem has 
led  theorists  to  mistakenly  favour  earth-based  inputs  over  cosmic  inputs,  to  over-emphasize 
biological evolution, and to under-emphasize stellar evolution.  These perceptive, methodological, 
and  logical  errors  have, in  turn, emphasized  the  significance  of  the  individual “struggle  against 
competitors” over the  cooperative “struggle against inclement environments”, and thus fashionable 
theories relating to Global Warming,  The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and The Tragedy of  
the Commons have been erected upon false and sandy foundations and suggest evolutionarily unstable 
solutions.  And to this point, in light of the discoveries presented here, we conclude that largely 
redirected  global  threat  mitigation  efforts  will  require  unprecedented  levels  of  international 
cooperation if long-term human survival is to be achieved.
Key Terms:   On the Origin of  Species, planetary evolution, stellar evolution, cosmic inputs, mass 
extinctions, sustainable economic development, tragedy of the commons, global threat mitigation, 
international cooperation, long-distance dispersal, problem-solving, human survival.
§1.  INTRODUCTION
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the  
Preservation of the Favoured Nations in the Struggle for Life (1) 
was published 150 years ago, in November of 1859, and – 
with De Re Militari (2), On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres  
(3), Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (4), A Treatise  
of Human Nature (5), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  
the Wealth of Nations (6), An Essay on the Principle of Population  
(7), Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (8), Personal  
Narrative (9), Cosmos (10), On the Law which has Regulated The  
Introduction of New Species (11), A Dynamical Theory of the  
Electromagnetic Field (12) eleven Annalen der Physik briefs (13-
23), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (24), Non-
Cooperative Games (25, cf., 26-27), The Logic of Scientific  
Discovery (28), Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids (29), Island  
Biology (30), The Pretense of Knowledge (31), The Process and  
Progress of Economics (32), Evolution and the Theory of Games  
(33),  The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (34),  What Makes  
Biology Unique (35), and War and Peace (36) – glimmers 
amongst our most brilliant illuminations, most valuable 
problem-solving tools, and most informative sources for 
long-term human survival strategies (S1).
     As a Fellow of the biological society where Darwin and 
Wallace devoted much of their efforts (37) and announced 
their discovery of evolutionary theory (38), it may come of 
little surprise that I hold the Origin in high regard (cf. S1). 
Furthermore, I concur that the Origin
exceeds  all  other  scientific  ‘classics’  of  past 
centuries in immediate and continued relevance to 
the  basic  theoretical  formulation  and  debates  of 
current practitioners. Careful exegesis of Darwin’s 
logic and intentions, through textual analysis of the 
Origin, therefore assumes unusual  importance for 
the contemporary practice of science (34, p. 58).
Which is exactly why it is critical why I must bring the 
grave nature of the Origin's most significant error to light.
     This task would not be nearly so difficult if it were not 
for the fact that much that we believe today has “been so 
thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle, whose influence 
has given rise to such deep-rooted prejudices that the 
prospect of dispelling them does not seem very bright” (39, 
p. 9), but  I will try, including a rough sketch of three 
intellectual obstacles which invariably block the doorway to 
these illusive truths.  Presently, we'll consider the most 
formidable issue; the others are briefly noted in §3. 
      The most menacing gargoyle is teleology.  
     Several methodological issues make it rather difficult to 
ascertain how little or much to say about this big problem, 
so I will offer a brief definition,1 a contextual footnote,2 and 
restrict focus to aspects most relevant to the problem at 
hand:
Natural selection does not guarantee the power of 
adaptation in all circumstances, and if environments 
change  rapidly  and  profoundly  enough,  these 
alterations may exceed the power of adaptation by 
natural selection, with extinction of most forms as 
the  expected  result,  even  in  the  most  strictly 
Darwinian of circumstances...
    Darwin’s hostility to catastrophic mass extinction 
does not arise primarily from threats posed to the 
mechanism  of  natural  selection  itself,  but  more 
from  the  challenges  raised  by  the  prospect  of 
sudden global change to the key… assumption that 
observable  processes  at  work  in  modern 
populations can, given the amplitude of geological 
time, render the full panoply of macroevolutionary 
results by prolonged accretion and accumulation.
The problem of mass extinction became acute for 
Darwin  because  geological  paroxysm  threatened 
something  quite  particular, vitally  important, and 
therefore  of  much  greater  immediate  pith  and 
moment  than  his  general  methodological 
preference for locating all causality in the palpable 
observation  of  microevolution…  Global 
catastrophe  could  undermine  the  ecological 
argument that Darwin had so carefully devised… 
to validate something more particular but no less 
important: his culture’s central belief in progress...
1 Any  processes  that  ‘persist  toward  an  end  point  under  varying 
conditions’ or in which ‘the end state of the process is determined 
by its properties at the beginning’ (35, p. 49).
2 Perhaps no other ideology has influenced biology more profoundly 
than  teleological  thinking...  In  one  form  or  another  it  was  a 
prevailing  world  view  before  Darwin....  It  is  reflected  by  the 
millenarian  beliefs  of  many  Christians,  by  the  enthusiasm  for 
progress  promoted  by  the  Enlightenment,  by  transformationist 
evolutionism, and by everybody’s hope for a better future….
     During the rise of deism, after the scientific revolution and 
during the era of Enlightenment, there was a widespread belief in 
the development of ever-greater perfection in the world through 
the  exercise  of  God’s  laws.  There  was  a  trust  in  an  intrinsic 
tendency  of  Nature  toward  progress  or  an  ultimate  goal. Such 
beliefs were shared even by those who did not believe in the hand of 
God but who nevertheless believed in a progressive tendency of the 
world toward ever-greater perfection.... Although Christianity was 
its major source of support, teleological thinking gained increasing 
strength also in philosophy, from its beginning with the Greeks... up 
to the 18th and 19th centuries. The concept of the  Scala Naturae…, 
reflected  a  belief  in  upward  or  forward  progression  in  the 
arrangement of natural objects. Few were the philosophers who did 
not express a belief in progress and improvement (35, pp. 39- 41).
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To  explain  the  general  pattern  of  life’s  history, 
Darwin  sought  to  extrapolate  the  results  of 
competition ordained by the immediacies of natural 
selection in ecological moments.  In particular…, 
to argue that most competition, in a world chock 
full of species, unfolds in the biotic mode of direct 
battle  for  limited  resources,  mano  a  mano so  to 
speak, and not in the abiotic mode of struggle to 
survive in difficult  physical conditions. If  struggle 
by... battle (which favors mental and biomechanical 
improvement)  trumps  struggle  against  inclement 
environment  (which  often  favors  cooperation 
rather  than  battle…),  then  a  broad  vector  of 
progress should pervade the history of life (34, pp. 
1298-1299).
But of course the fossil record has clearly demonstrated that 
this is not the case; and thus Darwin’s need to cater to the 
teleological worldview of the Victorian era has generated 
grave and, alas, very long-lasting consequences.  This 
seemingly minor flaw in this magnificent foundational work 
has spawned unintended consequences: (i) the gross 
underestimation of the global (not to mention national) 
threats presented by  cosmic inputs and (ii) our dire need 
for cooperation (cosmic threat mitigation efforts) at the 
global level.  I outlined these crucial points in S2 and 
enclosed this brief communiqué in a long letter (S1),
but  as  the  exposition  of  the  entire  group  of 
considerations would be rather difficult to follow, 
only  a  few  quite  elementary  reflexions  will  be 
given in the following pages, from which the reader 
will  readily  be  able  to  inform  himself  as  to  the 
suppositions of the theory and its  line of thought 
(21, p. 898).
§2.  ON DARWIN'S NONTRIVIAL ERROR
The 150th anniversary of the Origin and the 200th celebration 
of Darwin's birth have generated both praise and critical 
reassessments of Darwin's works and methodology.  To date, 
criticisms have merely recounted trivial errors (e.g., 40).
     However, in his most influential work of 1859, in order 
“to enhance the implausibility of truly catastrophic mass 
dying, Darwin holds that ‘the complete extinction of the 
species of a group is generally a slower process than their 
production” (1, p. 318, as cited in 34, p. 1300).   This 
nontrivial error has had the net effect of painting ourselves 
into a teleological corner, leaving us increasingly vulnerable 
to mass extinction.  Darwin confessed, “Scarcely any 
plaeontological discovery is more striking than the fact, that 
the forms of life change almost simultaneously throughout 
the world” (1, p. 322). And in pages 317-318 he had falsely 
concluded that...
this impression must be an artefact produced by the 
markedly incomplete preservation of more gradual 
and  continuous  change  in  a  woefully  imperfect 
geological  record...  ‘The  old  notion  of  all  the 
inhabitants of the earth having been swept away at 
successive periods by catastrophes is very generally 
given up, even by those geologists… whose general 
views would naturally lead them to this conclusion. 
On the contrary, we have every reason to believe, 
from  the  study  of  the  tertiary  formations,  that 
species  and groups of  species gradually disappear, 
one after the other, first from one spot, then from 
another, and finally from the world.’ (1, p. 302, as 
cited in 34, p. 1301).
This error continues to misguide science and pop-culture:
In  particular,  these…  assumptions  about  the 
extended duration of apparent mass extinctions led 
geologists  and  palaeontologists  to  favour  earth-
based rather than cosmic physical inputs…, and to 
focus  upon  telluric  influences  (like  changing 
climates  and sea levels)  that  could most easily be 
rendered  as  gradualistic  in  style.  So  strongly 
entrenched did this prejudice remain, even spilling 
over into popular culture as well, that a few years 
after Alvarez et al.  published their plausible, and by 
then  increasingly  well  affirmed,  scenario  of 
extraterrestrial impact as a catastrophic trigger for 
the  Cretaceous-Tertiary  event, the  New  York  Times 
even  ridiculed  the  idea  in  their  editorial  pages, 
proclaiming… that ‘terrestrial events, like volcanic 
activity or changes in climate or sea level, are the 
most immediate possible cause of mass extinctions. 
Astronomers should leave to astrologers the task of 
seeking the cause of earthly events in the stars’ (34, 
p. 1303).
If the problem at hand is not clear by now, please consider 
an extraordinary new book:  The Cosmic Connection: How 
Astronomical Events Impact Life on Earth (41):
Our ascendancy as a species is usually credited to 
Darwinian  processes, such  as  passing  along  traits 
from one generation to the next, genetic mutations 
that  improve  an  organism's  chances  of  survival, 
successful  adaptations  of  organisms  to  different 
regions or environments, and the flourishing of one 
species of another.  Nevertheless, evolution is not 
enough to explain the ascension of the human race 
on this amazing planet. In its most sweeping terms, 
life also results from conditions not of our world 
but of our universe (41, p. 10).
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Indeed, the social and the biological sciences tend to place 
undue emphasis upon very recent events – the social 
sciences find a great deal of significant data in the past few 
centuries, and the biological sciences find a great deal of 
significant data over evolutionary time, but, in reality, the 
Earth has experienced almost no significant cosmic events 
(and thus we find, in essence, almost no truly useful data) in 
the course of Hominid evolution.  
     For example the  “asteroid the size of Mount Everest” 
(41, p. 12) that splashed down along the coast of the Yucatán 
peninsula, resulting in the complete extinction of 70% of 
terrestrial life (including 100% of the dinosaurs) and 96% 
of all marine life, does, to be certain, represent one of the 
most significant events in natural history and therefore one 
of the most valuable pieces data on Earth – but neither 
economics, contemporary theorists, politicians, nations, 
nor popular culture are much concerned with this 'outlier'. 
And, once again, this is problematic, to say the least because
knowing how astronomical influences have shaped 
our world and enabled the human race to evolve 
and flourish gives us a unique perspective on the 
nature  and  direction  of  life  on  Earth  and  the 
possibility of life on other planets (41, p. 13).
“Mass extinctions are more frequent, more rapid, more 
intense, and more different in their effects than... 
Darwinian biology could permit” (34, p. 1312-1313), and 
this has had profound effects upon all sciences and politico-
economic development strategies.  To paraphrase J.B.S. 
Haldane (42), one does not have to be a profound realist to 
realise that consistently underestimating the probability of 
mass extinction finds favour with those clinging to 
teleological comforts, and creates serious problems for 
those who endeavour to develop and deploy evolutionarily 
stable strategies.
     And to make matters worse, those able-minded theorists 
(such as Alvarez et. al.) who possess the courage and take 
the time to patiently offer these unfashionable perspectives 
are invariably ignored or ridiculed.  Another such 
individual, Milutin Milankovitch, quietly pointed out that 
the Earth's axis is not fixed, but rather oscillates over a 
41,000 year cycle, an oscillation which appears to have 
been (and continues to be) the greatest long-term influence 
of climate change (41).  And, like many misunderstood 
visionaries, “Milankovitch was certainly on to something 
when practically everyone else thought he was not” (41, p. 
38).
     How was it that he was able to see something so clearly which 
so many others could not?  By simply adopting the universal 
worldview necessary to grasp the discovery illuminated 
here.
Milankovitch did not merely see the Earth and its 
sediments; he saw the Earth in space and in motion 
around the Sun over the course of millions of years. 
It  took uncanny vision to  step off  the  Earth  and 
look back from a distance of 100 million miles and 
watch  cogs  turn, then  forge  a... connection... It 
was  the same kind of  vision possessed by people 
like Agassiz, Adhemar, Croll, and Wegener, some of 
whom paid a high price to see worlds, possibilities, 
and connections that others  could, or would, not 
(41, p. 28).
Although  it  is  quite  true  that  “nothing  makes  sense  in 
biology except in the light of evolution” (43, p. 449), it is, 
also  true  that  nothing  on  Earth (or  elsewhere  in  the 
universe)  makes  sense  except  in  the  light  of  planetary, 
stellar, and galactic evolution:
Look anywhere beyond our little nook of  Galaxy 
and  you  will  see  a  universe  that  is  not  only 
dispassionate, but dangerous and random.  Comets 
plough into planets.  Stars explode without regard 
to what clinging forms of life may be in the vicinity. 
Black holes suck up space and time at will (41, p. 
63).
A Short History of Nearly Everything (44) suggests we will 
never accomplish the feat of interstellar travel.  However, as 
a naturalist, problem-solver, and optimist (as difficult as that 
may seem to believe) focused upon the problem of human 
survival, your author (and others, e.g., 45) has hope that 
where there is a will, there may be a way.  Furthermore, in 
essence, this pessimistic prophecy has already been refuted: 
not only are we presently capable of interstellar travel, we  
have, essentially, been travelling in such a manner for the past ≈13 
billion years:  Our planet – along with the rest of our solar 
system – is speeding through interstellar space at 12 miles 
per second “in the direction of the constellation Hercules, 
southwest of the bright star Vega and just north of the 
billowy clouds of the summer Milky Way” (41, p. 162).
§3.  DISCUSSION
What logical implications follow from this inescapable interstellar  
travel the inevitable cosmic imputs we will inevitably encounter  
along the way? What are the implications for the advancement of  
science? Politico-economics? National security? Human survival?
     In general, we may wish to start thinking more clearly 
about the road ahead, being mindful of obstacles we may 
wish to try to avoid or prepare to meet.
     But this would require – amongst a myriad of inter-
connected issues – the complete recognition and wide 
adoption of Sir Karl Popper's remarkable solution (28) to 
David Hume's Problem of Induction (5).  I've written on this 
topic at length (cf., S1-S2), and of course Nobel Laureates 
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and brilliant thinkers from F.A. von Hayek (45) to Steven 
Hawking (46) have all testified to the value of Popper's 
solution, but there seems little to indicate we are willing to 
relinquish our “intense desire for assured knowledge” (47, 
p. 22) and teleological fairytales.  It seems that no matter 
how much support is offered, our disdain for realism and 
affection for the Pretense of Knowledge (45) remains so strong 
that we'd rather be Fooled by Randomness (48) and commit 
ourselves to near-certain extinction than face these difficult 
truths (extinction would remain a high probability even if 
we were thinking clearly, strategizing, and acting 
accordingly).  Clear thinking about this problem would also 
require the recognition that economic power is not a 
primary power, but rather a derivative of military power, 
but this is yet another unfashionable truth which most 
would prefer not to recognize (S1).  Indeed, the inter-
related politico-economic implications which stem from 
Darwin's Error are so expansive and far-reaching, that we 
must simply confine ourselves to three brief examples.  
     Consider, for example, that growing legions of 
ideological environmentalists and an entire ‘school’ of 
economics (so-called ‘ecological economics’) have failed to 
recognize the existence, much less the significance, of cosmic 
inputs (cf. S2).  In fact, S2 swings such a heavy wrecking-ball 
through so many widely-held and wildly popular theories 
that it will unquestionably face fierce resistance1, and, as 
Edward De Bono once conjectured, it is possible that these 
unfashionable ideas “can only be expressed in book form” 
(49, p. 31); and thus, Fortune willing, a big book carrying a 
simple, straight-forward message – one long argument – is on 
the way (cf. S1, pp. 65-67).  
     But for now let's consider the manner in which S2 
falsifies the central thesis of ‘ecological economics’ (and 
hip-checks ideological environmentalism to the boards) – a 
refutation which, as you may note, receives scant attention 
in S2 – for it is quite unnecessary to falsify a ‘subject’ which 
does not exist (cf.  S1, pp. 80-81).  Consider the flimsy 
central thesis, as postulated by Herman E. Daly:
The facts are plain and  uncontestable: the biosphere 
is finite, nongrowing, closed (except for the constant 
input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws 
of  thermodynamics.  Any  subsystem, such  as  the 
economy, must  at  some point  cease  growing  and 
adapt  itself  to  a  dynamic  equilibrium, something 
like a steady state (50, p. 101).
1 I suppose the process of acceptance will pass through the usual four 
stages:
      1.  This is worthless nonsense,
      2.  This is an interesting, but perverse, point of view,
      3.  This is true, but quite unimportant,
      4.  I always said so (41, p. 464).
     But are the facts plain and uncontestable? 
     (i) Is the biosphere closed?
     (ii) Is solar energy a constant input? (cf. 41).
     (iii) Is solar energy the sole ‘cosmic input’ to consider? 
     I’m afraid school is officially in session for Professor 
Daly and his fashionable and influential colleagues, because 
the well confirmed existence of a wide variety of chaotic 
‘cosmic inputs’ demonstrates the false and sandy foundation 
that the central thesis of ecological economics was founded 
upon (S2).  Alas, the Earth has not, nor ever will be in 
equilibrium or steady state, as the problem of induction 
renders these states indeterminable (S2).
   But problems associated with Darwin's Nontrivial Error 
are certainly not limited to this popular branch of 
economics.  In fact, turning the pages of the most influential 
scientific journals (51) testifies to a near-universal 
misunderstanding of this matter.  For example, a review of 
Science's  'top articles of last month' reveals that, yet-again, 
Garret Hardin's 1968 Tragedy of the Commons (52) is counted 
amongst them, and very little literature review is required 
to conclude that this paper remains arguable the single-
most influential paper in science today. However, setting 
aside the fact that the citation itself (52) is incorrect [the 
proper citation is (8 ; cf. S1, pp. 81-82)], the logical 
implications which follow from the truths presented here 
falsify this highly influential theory; although this discourse 
is restricted to elementary reflexions, the indirect proof 
clearly outlined in S2 clarifies this conjecture; a more 
detailed refutation may be found in S1 (Appendix IV: On the  
Tragedy of the Prince Edward Island Commons).  Further 
reflexions on this refutation yield a bountiful harvest of 
related revelations, including the falsification of the 
findings of 2009 Sveriges Riksbank Prize winner, Elinor 
Ostrom.  Although detailed considerations remain outside 
the scope of this discourse, a review of her collected works 
(53-63) reveals common systemic errors and faulty 
perceptions throughout her works.  And this is, in large 
part, due to the fact that these faulty perceptions and 
methodological errors are the norm, not the exception:
When we look at the world around us we see (if we 
are attentive enough) what is actually there, even if 
what is actually there is not the same as what we 
expected to see there. When we turn our attention 
from  the  world  around  us  to  the  world  of 
possibilities that  we can imagine with our minds, 
however, perception does not work nearly so well. 
We often fail to see the obvious until it is too late 
or until somebody else sees it and points it out to 
us. And very often something that we think is the 
case is not the case at all (65, p. xiii).
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Ostom's untenable theories (53-63) were derived through 
the inductive analysis1 of data relating to her perceptions of 
various 'commons' problems around the world2 and 
inherently flawed by her inability to imagine the serious 
possibilities presented by cosmic inputs, and, to be fair, not 
only is she not alone, it seems the implications which follow 
from this problem remain largely unknown to all but your 
author.  And although Ostrom's methodological errors are 
somewhat well-known, they remain largely uncorrected:
We have always depended on analysis not only to 
solve  problems  but  also  for  our  source  of  new 
ideas. Most people in education, science, business 
and economics still believe that the analysis of data 
will  give  us  all  the  new  ideas  that  we  need. 
Unfortunately, this is not so. The mind can see only 
what  it  is  prepared  to  see. That  is  why  after  a 
breakthrough in science we look back and find that 
all the needed evidence was available a long time 
before but could be seen only through the old idea 
(49, p. 23).
Indeed, almost all of the truths presented here were known 
to us prior to the publication of the Origin in 1859, but alas, 
this is the process and progress of science (32).
     Yes, our planet is a precious resource which we must 
endeavour to protect – but it is also a depreciating asset 
which we must eagerly and voraciously consume in order to 
1 There is an obsession with history.  History is there and increasing 
in quantity, both because we are learning more about it and because 
we create it every day. We can get the 'teeth' of our minds into it. 
History is attractive because it is always possible to find a niche and 
there is always a reward for effort – in contrast to many subjects in 
which years of endeavour may produce nothing. It is attractive to 
minds with  a  preference  for analysis  over design...  It  may also, 
sometimes, be  a  refuge  for  minds  that  would not  achieve  much 
elsewhere (49, p. 24).
2 Ostrom  [(53)]  has  challenged  the  conventional  wisdom  that 
common property  is  poorly  managed  and  should  be  completely 
privatized or regulated by central authorities. Based on numerous 
studies  of  user-managed  fish  stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and 
groundwater basins, Ostrom concluded that the outcomes are often 
better than predicted by standard theories. The perspective of these 
theories was too static to capture the sophisticated institutions for 
decisionmaking and rule enforcement that have emerged to handle 
conflicts  of  interest  in  user-managed  common  pools  around  the 
world. By turning to more recent theories that take dynamics into 
account, Ostrom found that some of the observed institutions could 
be  well  understood  as  equilibrium outcomes  of  repeated games. 
However, other rules and types of behavior are difficult to reconcile 
with this theory, at least under the common assumption that players 
are selfish materialists who only punish others when it is their own 
interest. In  field  studies  and  laboratory  experiments  individuals’ 
willingness to punish defectors appears greater than predicted by 
such a  model. These  observations are  important  not  only  to  the 
study  of  natural  resource  management, but  also  to  the  study  of 
human cooperation more generally (64, pp. 1-2).
survive, and, given the game-theoretical framework 
presented in S2, we must assume a depreciation schedule of 
≈50,000 years.  In brief, our struggle to protect this asset 
must be balanced with a recognition that we have quite 
rightly been consuming (and must continue to consume) 
this resource in our resource-intensive quests for threat 
mitigation technologies (fission, fusion, spacecraft, 
weapons, telescopes, asteroid tugboats, gravity tractors, 
alternative food sources, underground/undersea human 
habitats, etc.) to help extend the shelf-life of the Earth and 
the life-span of the human species, and, moreover, to 
ultimately facilitate our  search for another world (ultra 
long-distance dispersal, cf. S2).  
     This new concept – ultra-long distance dispersal – happens 
to represent another intellectual (conceptual) obstacle 
which threatens to thwart our efforts here. Although 
Hawking champions this obvious objective (e.g., 45), few 
others eagerly second this motion.
     This may in part be due to the fact that, given Darwin's 
Error, with the notable exception of Sherwin Carlquist's 
revolutionary insights (cf. 66-68), theorists have also largely 
failed to recognized the central role of long-distance 
dispersal in the evolutionary process; and this brings us to a 
brief reflexion on the third obstacle which threatens to 
obliterate the truly inconvenient truths sketched here from 
the light of day: the manifold and intrenched problems 
associated with specialization:
The  specialization  of  science  is  an  inevitable 
accompaniment  of  progress;  yet  it  is  full  of 
dangers, and it is  cruelly wasteful, since so much 
that  is  beautiful  and  enlightening  is  cut  off  from 
most of the world.  Thus it is proper to the role of 
the scientist that he not merely find new truths and 
communicate it  to his  fellows, but that  he teach, 
that he try to bring the most honest and intelligible 
account of new knowledge to all who will  try to 
learn (69, pp. 138-139 ; cf. S2).
And thus we have reached the crux of this difficult climb. 
Oppenheimer estimated that scientists may make up about 
“one one-hundredth of a percent” of the human population 
(69, p. 94), and, to make matters worse, as  Dawkins often 
notes, everybody thinks they understand evolutionary 
theory – yet few truly do.  
     Furthermore, due to previous commitments (mostly 
religious commitments), many able-minded scientists reject 
evolutionary theory outright,  and, just when it seems the 
intellectual climate could be no worse, it turns out our 150 
year-old nontrivial error in the foundational base of 
evolutionary theory has generated countless and 
unquantifiable errors throughout the scientific world...
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We prefer  to  put  our  trust  in  evolution. This  is 
because  evolution  is  gradual  and  allows  the 
pressure of needs, values, reactions and events to 
mould  ideas.  It  allows  the  shaping  force  of 
criticism.  Bad  ideas  will  die.  Good  ideas  will 
survive and become even better. We really like the 
method of evolution because it fits our traditional 
thinking habits.  Change has its own energy and we 
can  modify  and  control  this  by  the  use  of  our 
critical faculties because criticism is the basis of our 
thinking tradition....
     In spite of these excellent reasons for preferring 
and trusting evolution, there is a serious flaw in... 
evolutionary [theory] (49, p. 19).
If this communique is intelligible to <.01% of the world, 
what are our true prospects for survival?  99.99% of all 
species that have ever inhabited the Earth are extinct; the 
average species lifespan is 2 Mya.  How do we communicate 
the logical implications and profound truths which follow 
from these findings in our fossil record?  How many will 
grasp that evolutionary stable global threat mitigation 
efforts would require a fundamental redirection of 
contemporary politico-economic development strategies 
and unprecedented levels of international cooperation? 
With these two salient questions in mind, I will sign off 
with the closing remark from a talk given at Princeton 
University on 1 January 1953:
Research is action; and the question I want to leave 
in a very raw and uncomfortable form with you is 
how to  communicate  this  sense  of  action  to  our 
fellow men who are not destined to devote their 
lives to the professional pursuit of new knowledge 
(69, p. 129).
Matt Funk, FLS, Mustique, 9 November 2009
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